May an Action for Trespass to Land in Another State Be Maintained in Kentucky? by Matthews, W. L., Jr.
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 28 | Issue 4 Article 5
1940
May an Action for Trespass to Land in Another
State Be Maintained in Kentucky?
W. L. Matthews Jr.
University of Kentucky
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Torts Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by
an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Matthews, W. L. Jr. (1940) "May an Action for Trespass to Land in Another State Be Maintained in Kentucky?," Kentucky Law Journal:
Vol. 28 : Iss. 4 , Article 5.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol28/iss4/5
NOTES
MAY AN ACTION FOR TRESPASS TO LAND IN
ANOTHER STATE BE MAINTAINED IN KENTUCKY?
In the case of a trespass to land it is the settled rule in
England and America that another state cannot take jurisdic-
tion of the cause of action arising therefrom. The action is
local and must be brought in the state where the land is situated.
This rule had its inception in England and apparently was
first announced in the case of Doulson v. Matthews,1 in 1792.
The leading case in America is Livingston v. Jefferson,2 decided
in the United States Circuit Court for the District of Virginia
by Chief Justice Marshall. This decision has been frequently
followed even in cases where all the parties were within the
jurisdiction and it was certain that the defendant could not be
reached by the courts of the state in which the land was
located.3
The concept that an action for injuries to land can be
brought only in the state where the real property is located
had its foundation in the distinction made between local and
transitory causes of action. Originally all actions were local
in the sense that they were all tried by a jury of the vicinage.
As the jury was limited to its own knowledge in deciding a
particular question it was necessary to select it from the neighbor-
hood where the issue arose. With the relaxing of procedural
requirements, the modern idea evolved that redress for a tort
is a personal right and may be asserted wherever the wrong-
doer is found. Nevertheless, the courts have retained the dis-
tinction between a cause of action that might have arisen any-
where, and one which could have arisen in only one place. The
former they have labeled transitory; the latter, local. Follow-
ing this classification led to the conclusion that, since it can
14 T. R. 503, 100 Eng. Rep. 1143 (1792); Storke, The Venue of
Actions of Trespass to Land (1921) 27 W. Va. L. Q. 301, 303.
2 Fed. Cas. No. 8,411 (C. C. A. Va. 1811).
sIbid.; Kroll v. Chicago B. & Q. R, Co., 98 Neb. 322, 152 N. W. 548,
549 (1915); Watt's Admr. v. Kinney, 23 Wend. 484 (N. Y. 1840);
Montesano Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Portland Iron Works, 78 Ore. 53,
152 Pac. 244 (1915).
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occur only where the land is located, a trespass to land gives
rise to a local cause of action only.
4
This distinction was clearly set forth in Livingston v. Jef-
ferson, and is followed by a majority of the courts today.5 In
this case Livingston, who owned lands along the Mississippi
River, had been ejected by United States troops under orders
of Jefferson. Subsequently Livingston sued for a large sum in
the Federal District of Virginia. A plea to the jurisdiction
was entered. Justice Tyler unhesitatingly adhered to the
English law and denied jurisdiction. Chief Justice Marshall
reluctantly concurred saying:"
"I have not yet discerned a reason, other than a technical one,
which can satisfy my judgment ... If however, a technical distinction
be firmly established, I cannot venture to disregard it... The dis-
tinction taken is, that actions are deemed transitory, where transac-
tions on which they are founded, might have taken place anywhere;
but are local where their cause is in its nature local."
The hesitancy of Marshall in pointing out this distinction
might suggest the possibility of limiting the rule to that class
of actions which are purely trespass quare clausum fregit as
contrasted with actions on the case for indirect or consequential
damages. There is however little authority in the cases for such
a distinction so far as it bears on the question of jurisdiction
now under consideration.7 The reasoning given in support of
I 1 Chitty, Pleading (8th Am. ed. 1840) 267: "When the cause of
action could only have arisen in a particular place or county it is local,
and the venue must be laid therein, as in mixed actions, waste, or
ejectment, for the recovery of seisin, or possession of land, or other
real property. So actions, though merely for damages, occasioned by
injuries to real property, are local." (Citing Doulson v. Matthews.)
5 Ellenwood v. Marietta Chair Co., 158 U. S. 105 (1895); Prichard
v. Campbell, 5 Ind. 494' (1854); Chapman v. Morgan, 2 Greene 374
(Iowa 1849); Brown v. Irwin, 47 Kan. 50, 27 Pac. 184 (1891) ; Champion
v. Doughty, 18 N. J. 3, 35 Am. Dec. 523 (1840); Hill v. Nelson, 70 N. J.
375, 57 Atl. 411 (1904); Dodge v. Colby, 108 N. Y. 448, 15 N. E. 703
(1888); Niles v. Howe, 57 Vt. 388 (1885); see Sentenis v. Ladew, 140
N. Y. 463, 35 N. B. 650, (1893) where the general rule was conceded,
but it was held that a judgment rendered by the Supreme Court of
New York, in an action for trespass on real property in Tennessee
would be binding and conclusive upon the parties, where no objection
was made until after the judgment had been rendered.
OLivingston v. Jefferson, Fed. Cas. No. 8,411, at 664 (C. C. A. Va.
1811). It is interesting to note that Storke feels Marshall was influenced
by the effect his decision might have on Thomas Jefferson, his political
enemy. Storke, supra note 1, at 304.
The distinction made between trespass quare clausum fregit and
trespass on the case has usually been applied where the act was in
one state and the injury occurred in another. See Ducktown Sulpher
Copper & Iron Co. v. Barnes, 60 S. W. 593, 606 (Tenn. 1900), which
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the general rule revolve' around the idea that because trespass
is a possessory action the title or boundary of the land injured
may enter into the case, and can best be solved by the court
which has the power to act on the title or order the land to
be surveyed.8
If an admittedly technical rule is to be followed it should
stand the test of practical application by reaching an equitable
result. Under modern conditions of transportation the
plaintiff has no remedy which can be enforced when a court
refuses jurisdiction in an action for trespass to land merely
because the land is situated in another state. If the offender
has no property, he need only cross the state line to evade service.
In an economic society which permits absentee ownership of
property, it is conceivable that both parties to such a suit
may reside outside of the jurisdiction where the land is located.
Furthermore a trespass is essentially a tort for which personal
damages are sought, and there appears to be no valid reason why
it should not be handled in a manner similar to other personal
actions.9
Marshall recognized the fact that the objections raised to
making the action transitory could also be raised in other
situations where the action has never been considered local
when he said:
"It is admitted that on a contract respecting lands, an action is
sustainable wherever -the defendant may be found; yet, in such a case,
every difficulty may occur which presents itself ifi an action of trespass.
An investigation of title may become necessary. A question of boundary
may arise . . .yet these difficulties have not prevailed against the
jurisdiction of the court. They have been countervailed, and more
than countervailed by the opposing consideration, that if the action be
disallowed, the injured party may have a clear right without a remedy
in a case where the person who has done the wrong, and who ought to
make the compensation, is within the power of the court."1
said in effect that residents of Georgia might maintain an action in
Tennessee, for injuries to their real property in Georgia caused by a
nuisance. But the nuisance was maintained in Tennessee, and even
courts which follow the general rule make an exception where the act
and the injury occur in different states. Stillman v. White Rock Mfg.
Co., Fed. Cas. No. 13,446 (C. C. A. R. I. 1847); Thayer v. Brooks, 17
Ohio 489, 49 Am. Dec. 474 (1848).
' See Tyler's opinion, Livingston v. Jefferson, Fed. Cas. No. 8,411
(C. C. A. Va. 1811).
9II Cooley, Torts (3rd ed. 1906) 899: "It is a general rule that for
the purpose of redress it is immaterial where a wrong was committed;
in other words, a wrong being personal, redress may be sought for it
wherever the wrongdoer may be found."
20 Livingston v. Jefferson, Fed. Cas. No. 8,411, at 664 (C. C. A. Va.
1811).
Noms
In spite of this analysis the courts have generally refused
to go against the authority in support of the historical rule.1
Only one state, Minnesota, has chosen to establish by actual
decision a minority to the effect that a trespass to land is no
different from any other wrong for which damages are sought.
After clearly and consisely stating the reasoning for and against
the rule, the court in Little v. Chicago, etc. Ry. Co.,12 said:
"We recognize the respect due to judicial precedents, and the
authority of the doctrine of stare decisis; but, inasmuch as this rule
Is in no sense a rule of property, and as it is purely technical, wrong
in principle, and in practice often results in a total denial of justice
... we do not feel bound to adhere to it, notwithstanding the great
array of judicial decisions in its favor. If the courts of England,
generations ago, were at liberty to invent a fiction in order to change
the ancient rule that all actions were local, and then fix their own
limitations to the application of the fiction, we cannot see why the
courts of the present day should deem themselves slavishly bound by
those limitations."
Both logical analysis and analogy seem to support the
position of this minority court, but by authority based on a
historical English rule, trespass to land is local in its nature
and hence local jurisdictionally. It is a curious and unfortunate
anomaly in the law of venue.
Though there is a text book statement to the effect that
an action for trespass to land is local in Kentucky, 13 no case
has been found which was decided squarely upon this point.
The dictum in Campbell v. Ritter Lumber Co.,' 4 is indicative
of the manner in which lip service may be paid to the rule,
but its direct application evaded. Here the plaintiffs entered
into a contract to sell certain timber on a tract of land in
Virginia, giving the vendee the right to use all the buildings
and improvements then on the land. The lumber company
proceeded to remove the timber and in the process removed the
n The language of Cullen, C. J. in Brisbane v. Penn. Ry. Co., 205
N. Y. 431, 98 N. E. 752, 753 (1912) is typical: "Were the question an
open one, I would favor the doctrine that our courts have jurisdiction
of actions to recover damages for injuries to foreign real estate."
1 65 Minn. 48, 67 N. W. 846, 847-848 (1896). This case was followed
in Peyton v. Desmond, 129 Fed. 1 (1904) on the grounds that such a
question was one for local decision by which the United States Circuit
Court of Appeals was bound.
13I Newman, Pleading and Practice (3rd ed. 1916) Sec. 23b:
"Actions, therefore, for damages occassioned by all injuries to real
property, are local ....
14140 Ky. 312, 314, 131 S. W. 20 (1910).
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building$ and further injured the property. Campbell filed
his petition in Kentucky. The court in taking jurisdiction
said:
"It has been held in a number of cases that an action of tort cannot
be maintained in one state to recover damages for trespasses on land
in another state.... We need not consider in this case whether the
rule (of Doulson v. Matthews) is in force in Kentucky. This is an
action upon a contract; and undoubtedly the cause of action upon a
contract follows the person .... "
It must further be considered whether section 62, sub-
section 4, of the Civil Code,1 5 would bind a Kentucky court
should it be called upon to determine its right to take jurisdiction
over a tort to foreign land. This section provides that:
"Actions must be brought in the county in which the subject of
the action, or some part thereof, is situated for an injury to real
property."
The presence of the word "county" in this section should
logically make it apply only where the question of venue within
the state is involved. It has been so held,' 6 and such a decision
is not out of line with those of other jurisdictions where similar
statutes have been interpreted.lT Vhen it is remembered that
process knows no county boundary, but must stop at the state
line in the absence of an attachment or equivalent procedure,
it is readily seen that the limitation placed on this code provision
is no strained or arbitrary one.
'-. Possibly the Kentucky courts would think themselves bound
by on-6 additional factor. This element is the extent to which
the common law of England is a part of our common law in this
jurisdiction. In other words, is Doulson v. Matthews a portion
of the English common law which has found its way into the
law of Kentucky ? By statutory provision the decisions of the
courts of Great Britain rendered since 1775 are not binding
authority upon the courts of this state,' 8 but attention must be
"The Code of Practice in Civil Cases (Carroll's 1935).
"Smith v. Southern Ry. Co., 136 Ky. 162, 165, 123 S. W. 678 (1909)
states: "The Civil Code of Practice, section 62, subsection 4...
applies noly to actions that arise or may be brought within the state."
2
7  was said in Wolff v. MeGaugh, 175 Ala. 299, 57 So. 754 (1911)
that the conflict among the cases over the jurisdiction of an action for
trespass to land in another state does not affect the question of venue
as between lifferent counties of the same state. See also the Home Ins.
Co. v. Penn. Ry. Co., 11 Hun. 182 (N. Y. 1877); Little v. Chicago, etc.,
Ry. Co., 65 Minn. 48, 67 N. W. 846 (1896).
"Carroll's Ky. Stat. (1936), Sec. 2418.
NoTEs
called to the fact that Kentucky upon becoming a separate state
adopted, by constitutional provision, "all laws which on the
first of June, 1792, were in force in the state of Virginia.
'"19
Virginia had previously by an ordinance of 1776 adopted "the
common law of England, and all statutes or acts of parliament
made in aid of the common law prior to the fourth year of King
James, and which were of a general nature, and not local to
that Kingdom. "20 Thus in order to be binding upon the courts
of Virginia and a part of the common law of that state which
was adopted by Kentucky, a decision of an English court must
have been rendered prior to 1776. The date of Doudson v. Mat-
tMews is 1792 and its rule is thereby eliminated.
Inasmuch as the question under consideration is undecided
in Kentucky, at least two alternatives are open to our courts.
The way shown by Minnesota is available. By clear-cut logical
decision a state may establish that there is no distinction to be
made with reference to a tort committed against foreign land
and a tort to personal property. Unfortunately few courts are
willing to surmount the obstacles presented by the influence of
neighboring authority and the tradition that the law of this
country in regard to land is essentially territorial. On the other
hand there is always the method of statutory reform. This way
is open to even those states that have followed the majority rule
explicitly. New York offers a model code provision in section
982a of the Code of Civil Procedure, 21 which reads:
"An action may be maintained in the courts of this state to recover
damages for injuries to real estate situated without the state, or for
breach of contracts or covenants relating thereto, whenever such an
action could be maintained in relation to personal property without
the state."
Such a provision removes the illogical contrast placed on real
and personal property when purely personal damages are sought
for their injury, and yet, retains as binding on both the ordinary
limitations of process and procedure which are characteristic of
the latter.
"Kentucky Constitution, Sec. 233.
See reference in Lathrop v. Commercial Bank, 38 Ky. (8 Dana)
114, 33 Am. Dec. 481, 488 (1839).
2 This provision is recommended by Storke, 27 W. Va. L. Q. 301,
311 (1921).
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If Kentucky should choose not to follow the technical and
impracticable rule that trespass to foreign land gives rise to a
local cause of action, it is submitted that there is no need for a
code revision. The practical and sound position pointed out by
Mfinnesota could and should be followed.
W. L. MATTHEWS, JR.
